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The existence of formal IPR laws can be considered a prerequisite for having 
efficient law enforcement but does not imply efficient enforcement in itself.  A 
simple model is constructed to explain the interplay between the IPR law and 
human  behavior within counterfeiting countries. It shows how a politically 
monitored IPR enforcement strategy is able to alter formal IPR laws or 
institutions but might not affect informal institutions, or human  morals and 
behavior, to the same extent, hence barely affecting piracy situation. The model 
shows the essential role of informal institutions and its sanction mechanisms in 
the enforcement process. The main obstacle of IPR enforcement is that people 
are still not convinced that IPR violations are unethical. Religion can be 
considered an informal institution that might support or hinder formal laws 
issued with regards to IPR and hence influence de facto enforcement of laws, 
especially in countries with high piracy rate  if a high adherence to religion is 
found.  As the Religion-Loyalty Index (RLI) developed by this study shows, 
Muslim countries  have the highest religiosity level among different religions. 
Consequently, an investigation of how Islamic jurisprudence views IPR piracy is 
conducted. As Islam generally  prohibits IPR piracy, a set of policy 
recommendations based on new institutional perspective is presented that can 
effectively help in minimizing IPR piracy in developing countries in general and 
Muslim ones in specific.  
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"It is by changing mindsets that we achieve the most lasting change. People have to understand that morally and 
ethically it is wrong to use pirated software” 
              Ajay Advani, chair of BSA Malaysia 
I-Introduction 
 
   Intellectual Property Right (IPR) enforcement is one of the most crucial topics of today’s 
trade settlements among countries.  Many countries claim to have an IPR law but are still 
suffering from a significant amount of IPR infringement. IPR infringement or piracy means 
the unauthorized use or copying of protected material without having permission from the 
right holder (Maskus, 2000). In 2008, pirated PC software was estimated to reach 41% of total 
PC software existing worldwide. Global losses due to IPR piracy increased to USD53bn in the 
same year, out of USD48bn in the previous year. In other words,  for every USD100 of 
legitimate software sold, another USD69  was pirated. Average piracy rate in the field of 
software within the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe 
reached 63% in 2008. Accordingly, more than half of the software users in these regions use 
pirated software (BSA, 2009). External pressure from both international organizations as well 
as developed countries is exerted on infringing developing countries which led, wholly or 
partially, to the issuance of laws that protect IPR in these countries. However, the impact of 
such laws is still not fully realized as the piracy rate
1
 
  is increasingly disproportionate between 
developing and developed countries. Interestingly, in persuading infringing countries to 
impose stricter regulations and formal laws against IPR piracy, no real concern was given to 
the informal moral and ethical structure existing in these countries. IPR piracy may be 
considered illegal.  However, it is still ethically acceptable in the infringing countries 
depending on the prevailing ideology in these societies. Consequently, this will negatively 
affect the enforceability of these IPR laws as the law enforcers themselves also count as 
members of the society. Therefore, they will not be motivated enough to prevent piracy. 
Moreover, a pirate’s feelings of guilt and fear of shame and embarrassment will be held at a 
minimum as she conforms to the society’s ideology which does not condemn such an act.  
Assessing a certain society’s ethical orientation towards IPR is thought to be a cumbersome 
task. However, two important observations can be used to deal with such difficulty, first; 
several studies show that religiosity is inversely related to the level of economic development 
                                                 
1 Piracy rate is defined as the total number of units of pirated software put into use in a year divided by the total 
units of software sold (BSA, 2008). 3 
 
in countries investigated. Second; IPR-related literature stresses on the negative relation 
between IPR piracy rate and economic development. Therefore, a link between religiosity and 
IPR piracy can be examined. Since an increase in level of religiosity directly affects the 
morality and ethics of individuals in a certain society, we can investigate the moral and ethical 
stance of this society towards IPR by investigating how this highly-adherence religion deals 
with this controversial issue. However, to establish the evidence that this religion is being 
closely followed by its adherents, it is essential first to measure the level of religiosity related 
to different religious sects. For this purpose, we develop an index of religious loyalty in this 
study. We find that Islamic societies are the highest religiously-loyal societies among other 
religious sects. Moreover, Islamic countries have a very high piracy rate in comparison with 
countries. We then check to see if Muslim scholars think that IPR piracy is ethical from the 
Islam’s point of view. We examine Islamic texts and fatwas and we reach the conclusion that, 
although Islam generally forbid IPR piracy, special permissions to copy illegal software is 
given to individuals in cases of necessities. The main issuers of such permissions are the 
Muslim scholars and sheikhs whom, in case they were asked for a fatwa
2
 
 with regards to this 
issue, they consider the inquirer’s specific social and economic circumstances before passing 
on their opinion. Since most, if not all, of the Muslim countries are developing ones, they 
have a high percentage of poor citizens that cannot bear the cost of buying legal software 
copies. Consequently, Muslim scholars and sheikhs give permissions for the needy 
individuals to pirate this software in case it is essential to the inquirer (e.g. Microsoft 
Windows, Microsoft Office). We propose that software companies that suffer losses due to 
piracy in Muslim countries collaborate with Muslim scholars in these countries so that an 
agreement is held between both parties. This agreement entails software companies to 
establish a price differentiation policy in Islamic countries where software prices are reduced 
respectively in these specific countries which enables Muslim scholars and sheikhs  to 
condemn and forbid Muslims of committing acts of IPR piracy since the necessity of pirating 




                                                 
2 According to Oxford online dictionary (2010), Fatwa is a ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a 
recognized authority. 4 
 
1.1 Literature Review 
 
Most of the economic literature dealing with IPR initially focused on two research points. The 
first was mainly investigating the effect of IPR on innovation, while the second analyzed the 
relation between IPR enforcement and economic growth. Different levels of analysis were 
used in these researches, whether it is national, regional or global. Regarding the former, 
several studies showed that IPR broadly fosters innovation which positively affects future 
growth and prosperity (e.g. Chin and Grossman, 1988; Diwan and Rodrik, 1991; Helpman, 
1993; McCalman, 2000; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Alfranca and Huffman, 2003, Kanwar and 
Evenson, 2003; Lai and Qiu, 2003; Schneider, 2005; Hu and Mathews, 2005; and Léger, 
2007).  Similarly for the latter, another body of economic literature supported the hypothesis 
that IPR positively affects the economic development (e.g. Gould and Gruben, 1996; Ginarte 
and Park, 1997; Markusen, 1998; Thompson and Rushing, 1999; Schneider, 2005; and 
Falvey, Foster and Greenaway, 2006). Nevertheless, a considerable number of studies 
supported the opposite idea on both accounts and argued that IPR laws inhibit innovation and 
hinders the economic growth, especially in developing countries (e.g. Penrose, 1951; Plant, 
1974; Kinsella, 2001; Verzola, 2004; Stiglitz, 2006; Boldrin and Levine, 2008; and Mason, 
2009).   
 
Although the literature on the effect of IPR on economic development is still controversial, 
most countries already signed the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and have already issued their IPR law according to the international 
standards. Moreover, some countries have even established a special police unit to combat 
IPR piracy, as in the case of Bulgaria, Colombia, Egypt, France and Turkey among others 
(WIPO, 2010). Accordingly, the focus point of recent literature on IPR became identifying the 
determinants of IPR piracy within a country, to be able to explain why IPR laws are not 
efficiently  implemented although they exist  in infringing countries, especially developing 
ones which continue to have a high recorded levels of piracy rate. A common conclusion of 
most IPR studies -whether for or against IPR in the first place - is that IPR piracy is mainly 
related to levels of per capita income or economic development of each country. In other 
words, rich nations (Western countries) are more likely to convey with formal IPR laws, 
rather than poor ones. This finding is supported by Maskus and Penubarti (1995), Ginarte and 
Park (1997), Maskus (2000), Marron and Steel (2000) and Husted (2000). Recently, other 
studies have analyzed the effects of a range of domestic economic, political and social 
variables, such as the size of the economy, research and development expenditures, education 5 
 
levels, economic openness, political pressure, political freedom, market freedom, sanctions 
and culture on IPR piracy (see Shadlen, Schrank and Kurtz, 2004; Bezman and Depken, 2004; 
Depken and Simmons, 2004; Grossman and Lai, 2004; Huk and Shadlen, 2005; van 
Kranenburg and Hogenbirk, 2005; and Fischer and Andrés, 2005). Almost all of these studies 
support the claim that economic, political and formal legal factors significantly affect piracy 
rates. None of the previous studies clearly identifies the informal institutional or cultural 
factors and their possible impact on the implementation of the IPR law. 
 
As it was previously deduced from the related literature that a negative relation does exist 
between level of economic development and IPR piracy, another relation is also invoked 
through literature between economic development and religiosity. Such relation is 
investigated through two main hypothesis; secularization hypothesis and religion-market 
model. On the one hand, Secularization hypothesis examine the effect of religiosity related to 
different religions, on economic development (Chaves, 1994; Grier, 1997; Blum and Dudley, 
2001; Bruce, 2001; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003; North 
and Gwin, 2004; Noland, 2005; Cavalcanti, Parente and Zhao, 2007), however, on the other 
hand, literature adopting religion-market model hypothesis looks on the impact of economic 
development on religiosity as a dependent variable (Iannaccone, 1991; Iannaccone and Stark, 
1994; Smith, Sawkins and Seaman, 1998; Gill 1999; Smith and Sawkins, 2003; McCleary and 
Barro, 2006; Lopez and Santos, 2008). A debate is still raging among scholars with regards to 
the direction of causality of religion-economic development relationship. Nevertheless, a 
pattern seems to emerge among the aforementioned studies, most importantly in McCleary 
and Barro (2006), as well as through world values survey and Gallup international surveys 
that investigated religion along with global demographics. This pattern relates a country’s 
progress in its level of economic development with a negative relation of the spirituality and 
religiosity of its population. In other words, as countries develop economically, there is less 
emphasis on dominant religious traditions and values and more emphasis placed on secular 
institutions. Figure (1) is developed by Gallup to demonstrate this relation.  
From the above, we can deduce that developing countries have a high level of both IPR 
















Source: Crabtree and Pelham, What Alabamians and Iranians Have in Common, Gallup website, 9
th of February, 2009. 
 
Although religion plays an important role in formulating culture (Lewis-Fernandez and 
Diaz, 2002), studies that tackled the link between IPR and cultural factors have not taken 
religion into account so far. Kovacic (2007) affirms that Hofstede’s cultural model (Hofstede, 
1981, 2004) is the most frequently used cultural model in software piracy research (see for 
example, Depken and Simmons, 2004; Husted, 2000; Ki, Chang, and Khang, 2006; Kyper 
Lievano, Mangiameli, and Shin, 2004; Moores, 2003; Ronkainen and Guerrero-Cusumano, 
2001; Shin, Gopal, Sanders, and Whinston, 2004). Moreover, as noted by Shore et al. (2001), 
cross-cultural research that explored the relation between IPR piracy and ethical or moral 
behavior remains limited. Swinyard, Rinne and Keng Kau  (1990) analyze the attitudes 
towards software copyright laws and the behavioral intentions towards these laws in the US 
and Singapore and found that both attitudes and behavioral intentions of Americans are more 
harmonious with copyright laws than those of Singaporeans. Moreover, the authors find that 
“not only does the Asian culture provide less support for copyright legislation; it provides 
more support for the human benefits which might come from the piracy”. Al-Jabri and Abdul-
Gader (1997) derive a model to explore the effects of individual and peer beliefs on software 7 
 
copyright infringements in Saudi Arabia through conducting a survey. The results of this 
study show that beliefs, whether for individuals or for peers, have significant effects on 
ethical intention to respect or infringe protected software. El Sheikh, Rashed, Qudah, and 
Peace (2006) conduct a similar study in Jordan and discovered that the majority of the survey 
respondents (63%) believe that the act of piracy is unethical and wrong. The authors argue 
then that raising the awareness of the negative ethical consequences of piracy could be useful. 
Most recently, Haigh (2008) examines the interaction of technology, software users, and 
regulatory regimes related to piracy in Ukraine. The author concludes that “because each 
nation has its own history, the traditional understandings and social norms on which Internet 
users draw will be quite different in each country”.  
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
 
IPR laws are a set of formal institutions that are designed to influence human behavior 
towards respecting IPR. All the previous efforts and pressure practiced by international 
organizations to enforce IPR in developing countries stimulate the procedure of improving 
formal administrative and judicial institutions of IPR without any significant effect on factual 
enforcement, since almost all of these countries have signed TRIPS agreement and issued 
their own IPR laws. Nevertheless, average piracy rate among this group of countries is still 
70% (BSA, 2009). Improving the de jure legal institutions of IPR is not necessarily 
accompanied by successful de facto institutions. Factual enforcement of IPR is one of the 
most crucial topics of today’s trade agreements among countries. Legislative movements and 
government reforms toward achieving a best practice model or best practice institutions of 
IPR protection have increased significantly, mainly as a result of the growing attention given 
to IPR related issues in the foreign trade policy of the United States. Right holders expected 
the government of each country to bear the responsibility creating, specifying, enacting and 
enforcing IPR according to the international standards, as they assumed that it can do so at 
lower cost. During the 21st century, several right holders, especially in the field of software 
came together and formed collective interest groups that started to practice further pressure on 
governments to impose more severe punishments for deterring IPR infringement. Being the 
world’s largest software supplier, the US has launched an anti piracy campaign, putting 
countries who fail to impose deterrent penalties on a “Watch List” which was set up by the 
1988 US Trade Act to be able to impose trade sanctions on persisting counterfeiting 8 
 
countries
3. Section 182 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 
2242 encompassed the so called "Special 301" provisions. These provisions were issued to 
form a major US trade tool to control international copyright piracy and are considered a vital 
tool for the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
4
  Source: Business Software Alliance (BSA), Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study, Various Issues. 
 to stop the increasing losses in US 
jobs and competitiveness (Sykes, 1992). Hence, developing countries who have signed 
Bilateral Trade Agreements (BITS) with the US and members of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) trade program will be threatened to be deprived from the benefits they are 
enjoying. The U.S. GSP is a program designed to promote economic growth in developing 
world by providing preferential duty-free entry for about 4,800 products from 131 designated 
beneficiary countries. However, looking at the piracy trends of most developing countries 
mostly benefiting from the GSP program, it can be said that sanction threats does not 
significantly affect software piracy. Figure 2  shows software piracy trends per region, 
indicating fluctuations around an average piracy rate of 63% in 2009 after having reached an 
average piracy rate of 57% during 2002/2003. Hence,  sanction threats and the pressure 
towards more legal reforms alone might not be enough.  
 
                                                 
3 As it is the prevailing case with China, with 100% tariffs on its trade with the US. 
4 USTR is an agency of over 200 people, a highly committed group of professionals who have decades of 
specialized experience in trade issues and regions of the world. They negotiate directly with foreign governments 
to create trade agreements, resolve disputes and participate in global trade policy organizations. They also meet 
with governments, business groups, legislators and public interest groups to gather input on trade issues and 
explain the president’s trade policy positions. The agency was founded in 1962 and has offices in 
































Figure 2: Software Piracy Trends per Region 1994-2009
Latin America Eastern Europ Asia/Pacific Middle East and Africa 9 
 
From the above figure, it can be noticed that only recently (during the last 5 years) global 
software piracy rates of the 4 highest piracy regions (Latin America; Eastern Europe, Middle 
East and Africa, Asia and Pacific) are diverging towards an average of 60 %. In other words 
the fluctuations tend to diminish and the trends are somehow converging. Right holders link 
this fact to what can be called cooperative enforcement strategies. These imply that the right 
holder should participate in the evolution process of IPR institutions depending on joint firm 
based, as well as government based, enforcement models. These models are usually designed 
according to the strategic importance, market share, piracy rate, legal environment, corruption 
level and last but not least the informal institutions of the country in question. Hence, there 
will be no one-fits-all piracy enforcement model, but rather a tailored model that should suit 
the prevailing formal and informal institutions in a group of countries. A most prominent 
cooperative example is done by a number of software firms. They signed cooperative 
enforcement agreements with a number of selected host countries and offered original 
products to students and public ministries mainly those of poor developing countries at a 
cheap price in order to encourage them to adapt efficient IPR policies. The agreement held 
between Microsoft and the Egyptian ministry of education would reflect such a case where 
the usage of Microsoft products in all Egypt’s public schools was formally legalized. The 
Egyptian government, in return, was encouraged to enforce IPR laws in a more efficient way; 
reducing the piracy rate in Egypt from a pre-agreement estimate of 58% to reach 52% in 2002 
(Microsoft Egypt, 2002). Moreover, several software companies used the Egyptian media, 
hiring well known actors to signal the disadvantages of piracy in a simple way
5
                                                 
5 An interesting case related to IPR in Arab countries happened when, in 2007, one of the largest Arab media 
networks, Arab Radio and Television Network (ART), requested Amr Khaled, a famous Muslim preacher and 
producer of several famous programs through its cable channels,  to present a media message, prohibiting the 
usage of illegal means to watch these channels and endorsing IPR of the right holders. Amr Khaled was called 
“Islam’s Billy Graham” by the British “The Independent” newspaper (2006) and was chosen as sixth most 
influential intellectual in the world by Prospect magazine in 2005 (Prospect magazine website, 2008) and 
number 19 of the world's most influential people by Time Magazine in 2007 (Time magazine website, 2007), 
which shows how much he is influential on the Muslim societies, in particular, Arabic ones. However, several 
newspapers and news websites started attacking Khaled’s message and argued that the Arab Muslims were 
enraged by this act and described it as a “paid advertisement”. The argument behind such attack was not the 
message itself but rather that ARTsubscription prices were very expensive to citizens of the Arab region to 
extent that it was described as “prohibitive” (Ghazal, 2006) and  “closer to a monopolist’s fees rather than 
marginal cost” (Malkawi, 2007). Consequently, Amr Khaled’s credibility was severely damaged (see for 
example Alfajr website, 2007; and Bahrain online, 2008). Such attack was so severe that Amr Khaled submitted 
a public apology for taking part in such an IPR protection campaign. It can be deduced from such case that 
religious influence was viewed by ART officials as an essential motivator for Arab Muslims’ moral and behavior 
choices. However, these officials did not take into consideration the effect of ART’s high subscription prices on 
individuals’ choices to illegally watch ART channels.   
. However, 
such agreements managed to stabilize or hinder the increase of piracy rates rather than 
significantly diminishing such type of behavior.  An average piracy rate of 60% in Egypt can 10 
 
still not be tolerated by right holders and that is why an analysis of the informal institutions 
(morals and ethics) imbedded within the IPR system of counterfeiting countries becomes 
crucial. 
 
 The New Institutional Economics (NIE)  presents a clear explanation about the possible 
failures of laws as a type of formal institutions when not supported by society’s norms, 
culture, beliefs and religion, the so called informal institutions. Hence, one could think of 
religion as being an effective tool to guide people towards separating what is right from what 
is wrong. Moreover,  it can be considered a main source of identifying morals and ethics in a 
certain society. This tool might achieve significant results, especially in countries with strong 
adherence to religion.   
    
   This study generally analyzes the significance of using religion as a set of informal 
institutions to improve the overall piracy situation in strong religious countries. Section two 
presents a  short outline of  the emergence and change of IPR institutions  in developing 
countries to show that external pressure and international commitments can be considered 
necessary but not sufficient for reducing piracy in developing countries, as cooperative 
tailored enforcement models to tender the gap between formal and informal institutions tend 
to be more effective. Section three illustrates the role of informal institutions in effectively 
changing human behaviour. We present a model analysing the interplay between formal rule, 
religion and human behaviour and describe how this relation can be affected by diverging 
formal and informal institutions to explain the failure of the IPR transplantation process. 
Section four uses descriptive statistics to be able to draw conclusions about religious loyalty. 
The main finding is that Muslim societies are still the keenest to follow the restrictions of 
their religion. The results interpreted from this measurement are then used to analyse the role 
of religion as a  possible  informal institution  in  shaping  human behaviour towards 
understanding the ethics of IPR protection.  Section  five  will try to shed light on  the 
mechanism of formulating Islamic legal judgments. This will be of importance to see exactly 
where IPR fit under such Islamic legal framework. However, this can only be realized if the 
IPR products themselves do not violate the Islamic pricing mechanism. In other words they 
should be sold in a fair manner.  Therefore, section Six will mainly deal with informal 
enforcement of IPR laws in Islamic countries by investigating the interaction between prices 
of IPR products and the aforementioned kind of enforcement which is based on the society’s 11 
 
participation in condemning and stopping acts of piracy. Section seven concludes by 
highlighting the main findings of the study. 
II- The Emergence and Change of Institutions: “The IPR Law” 
 
   IPR is a field of law that deals with property rights in intangible property. They are humanly 
made constraints that forbid any unauthorized use or copying of protected work or material. 
Thus they are considered formal institutions, and as institutions are realized through a 
sanction system, IPR is protected by the IPR law that includes a punishment for whoever 
breaks it.  A minimum degree of knowledge about institutions needs to be presented before 
starting to discuss the problems associated with existing IPR laws and the conflicts that often 
occur in international disputes in order to achieve factual efficient enforcement.  
 
2.1 IPR Laws: “A Set of Formal Institutions” 
 
   North (1990) defines institutions as being humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction (economic, political or social). Any institution results from a series of decisions by 
which a group of individuals determines how to conduct and regulate the interactions among 
members of the group. In other words, institutions are considered sets of rules that are 
recognized and frequently followed by members of the community. He differentiates between 
three types of institutions: formal institutions (e.g. formal rules, laws); informal institutions 
(e.g. norms, traditions, culture) and enforcement mechanisms (judicial, syndicates) (North, 
1990). Thus, it can be said that the distinction between formal and informal institutions in this 
case, depends on the rule component of institutions. Ostrom (1986:5) defined formal rules or 
institutions as being prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to order 
repetitive, independent relationships. Prescriptions refer to devices that structure human 
behaviour, as to show what is right from what is wrong and prohibited. Voigt (2008), 
conversely, uses the terms internal and external institutions. He builds his classification of 
institutions on who sanctions the rule-breaker: if rule breaking is sanctioned by the state, 
institutions are called “external” and if it is done by members of the society (e.g. family, 




                                                 
6 Also see Kiwit and Voigt (1995). 
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 Issuing formal IPR rules or amending existing laws is doable, as it only implies  the 
legislation of a new law by the parliament. However, factual enforcement of the law involves 
a lot of more interactive procedures that are accompanied with high transaction costs. IPR 
enforcement in general involves a great number of delegations and a great number of tasks 
until it reaches the hands of last resort enforcers (could be the judges), hence it involves high 
monitoring and controlling costs. Furthermore, it is worth noting that developing countries 
with large segments of poor people that rely mainly on access to cheap pirated software face a 
huge conflict when trying to enforce IPR to abide by extensive bilateral and multilateral 
pressure. This is due to the fact that they have to bear the extra fiscal cost of enforcement and 
deprive their poor citizens from using software products that might be essential to the 
development and knowledge of the whole society. This fact decreases the incentives of 
authorities to effectively enforce the law. Another important factor that deserves special 
attention is the lack of any guilt feeling by pirates and the rest of the society concerning the 
buying and selling of pirated products, which can be considered a main reason behind the 
prevailing inefficient IPR protection framework. According to the NIE the quality of legal 
enforcement mechanisms (judiciary, prosecutors) is to a large extent influenced by their 
beliefs and incentives, which are influenced by their surrounding culture and the mechanisms 
overseeing their decisions within this culture (Voigt, 2008). 
 
 Norms of behaviour are essential to legitimize any set of formal rules. North (1990) points 
out that institutional evolution is based on definite factors, such as country’s history, values 
and traditions, which give the country its context specific characteristics. As a result, the 
evolutionary path of institutions can be different among countries as far as it is not determined 
only on the basis of formal rules and constitutions.  In other words, countries applying the 
same formal rules will have very different economic performance characteristics, due to the 
fact that they have different informal norms and enforcement characteristics (North, 1998:25). 
This fact can explain generally the failure of some formal rules from successful Western 
economies when applied by other Third World economies (North, 1996). 
 
It is very hard to determine a unique set of appropriate formal or external institutional 
arrangements that could be implemented in all countries without taking the already existing 
informal or internal institutional setup of each country into consideration. Rodrik (2008:2) 
describes the type of institutional reform promoted by multilateral organizations as being 
heavily biased towards a best-practice model. This model presumes that the primary role of 13 
 
institutional arrangements is to minimize transaction costs in the immediately relevant domain 
without paying attention to potential interactions with institutional features elsewhere in the 
system. Accordingly, a new model should be rather designed for IPR enforcement to convince 
countries and corporations that their own interests will be injured by piracy and that 
combating these thefts is vital to the interests of both parties. In other words, one should look 
for alternative tools that converge  the existing formal rules in a way that can gradually 
accommodate with the prevailing informal institutions in each country. The effectiveness of 
new institutions will thus depend on the path of institutional change and the relation between 
formal and informal institutions prevailing in each country. 
 
2.2  IPR Enforcement and the Path of Institutional Change 
    
Institutions in general underlie continuous changes according to their social nature. Thus as 
human behaviour changes over time, institutions might change as well. The problem of IPR 
protection in developing countries as explained before is the fact that existing formal rules fail 
to influence the informal behaviour of human beings toward respecting such rights. Thus, it 
might become useful to search for factors that influence the informal institutions directly, 
without using the formal ones.  
 
Gursevaja and Eickhof (2007), explain that Institutional change in general can emerge due 
to one of three factors: a technological change, a change in the way the society value things 
(Value change), or politically set strategies and rules (politically monitored change). The 
emergence of IPR laws can be linked to the first and second factor concerning their 
emergence in developed countries; however, they are a result of path three concerning the 
case of developing countries. It is worth mentioning that the first two factors stimulate an 
endogenous change of the society itself. Thus informal institutions lead the change as in the 
second case or are accompanied by a parallel change of the formal institution as in the first 
case. The third factor on the other hand stimulates an exogenous change, as it implies the 
formation of new formal rules discarding completely the informal institutions. This requires a 
change in the informal institutions without providing a stimulating factor that can effectively 
lead this change process. Of course, exceptions may exist if by chance the new formal 
institutions are designed to complement existing informal institutions.  Veblen (1961/1919) 
also argues that institutional change could be achieved best through previous technological 
change. He argues that technological innovation amends habits and behaviour directly and 14 
 
indirectly throughout a change in the formal framework (Veblen, 1961/1919:231-251). 
However, this concept cannot be easily achieved in least developed countries as they still have 
a long way to go before reaching such level of technological sophistication. 
Hayek (1969) refuses the idea of achieving institutional change through politically set 
strategies. According to his point of view, institutions are supposed to be the outcome of a 




Transplantation of rules is considered a pure politically motivated institutional change, hence 
a type of formal institutions that should create new informal institutions.  Thus, it becomes 
clear that informal institutions enjoy a high amount of power. Without being able to change 
this type of institution, any change in formal rules will not achieve its desired target. In other 
words, the importance of informal institutions must be recognized and properly treated in 
order to achieve the desired institutional change. However, one must keep in mind that as 
formal institutions (statute law, common law, regulations) can be easily changed, informal 
institutions (norms of behaviour, self imposed codes of conduct) may change only gradually, 
and are essential to legitimize any set of formal rules (North, 1990). Accordingly, new social 
mechanisms or tools that can gradually bridge formal and informal institutions of IPR through 
creating a change in domestic norms and values might result in higher success. 
Formal and informal institutions in general could have a neutral, complementary, 
substitutive or conflicting relation (Kiwit and Voigt, 1995). Being complementary can lead to 
optimal results; however being conflicting, will never lead to satisfying results.  The authors 
argue that the problem of inefficient IPR enforcement in developing countries could be the 
outcome of such conflicting institutions. In other words, it is expected that the efficiency of 
emerging IPR institutions will be adversely affected by the prevailing discrepancies between 
both types of institutions, especially in developing countries. Informal institutions could put 
pressure on the existing legal system and lead the institutional change on the one hand, or 





                                                 
7 For more discussions about the evolution of institutions, see: Menger (1883); Hayek (1969); Schotter (1986); 
Langlois (1986); Kiwit and Voigt (1995). 15 
 
III- The Interplay between Rule and Behaviour 
 
  As mentioned in the above section, the probability of successfully enforcing a formal 
institution through politically set strategies and rules is very weak. So what should be done in 
order to ensure institutional effectiveness? The key to answer this question is being able to 
identify the complementary role of formal and informal IPR institutions in the interplay 
between rule and behaviour. People usually respond to incentives and act according to certain 
rules imposed by the society or the government. As long as incentives to follow a certain rule 
are missing, people will not convey to the rule.  
 
Talking about effectiveness of rules, some would argue that a deterrent sanction is sufficient 
for determining the effectiveness of any formal institution. However, we should keep in mind 
that punishment should fit the crime and consequently each country has to set or evaluate IPR 
piracy based on personal value judgements. Moreover, the existence of a deterrent sanction as 
stated by the law does not necessary imply practicing the sanction in reality. According to 
Ghada Khalifa, antipiracy manager at Microsoft Egypt, Comparing the software piracy rates 
provided by the global software piracy study of the Business Software Alliance (BSA) with 
the actual number of cases that were factually sanctioned due to IPR violations within the 
same country, large discrepancies  can be noticed (Personal Communication, 6
th  of April, 
2005).  
 
The process of IPR enforcement in most developing countries is usually governed by the 
criminal law and under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, which implies a significant 
involvement of the state in investigation and prosecution. Lax enforcement implies that 
infringement cases might be brought to court by prosecutors but not be sanctioned by judges 
or they might not be caught by the police in the first place. Thus, the IPR law becomes not 
deterrent and might lose its power after some time. This fact becomes even more evident 
when informal institutions and social or cultural norms do not support these formal laws. To 
simplify the relation between the imposition of a formal IPR law and its enforcement within 
the society, one could look at the following model that represents the interplay between IPR 





Figure 3, is a simplified model representing the interplay between the imposition of a new 
formal rule and human behaviour. In other words, it explains how the society responds to 
imposed formal institutions (e.g. IPR law).  Mansfield (1994) determined three areas of 
concern in assessing the strength of property rights enforcement in a country. These are the 




 Thus, on the one hand, the government should not only approve a law but must also 
believe in its importance and be willing to practically enforce it in order to achieve strong 
efficient IPR enforcement. On the other hand, public support must be present. The society 
should be motivated or carefully guided to the moral reasons behind respecting a certain law. 
Such moral reasons are affected, whether directly or indirectly, through adherence to a 
specific religion. The divergence between citizens’ actual and expected behaviour after the 
issuance of the law can be attributed to their moral and ethical stipulation. In other words, 
ceteris paribus, it is expected that a newly-issued law can be enforced more effectively in a 
society that adhere to a certain moral and ethical code that correspond with that particular law 
than in a society where its moral stance oppose it.  
The figure tries to illustrate such observation as it shows that a pirate has to choose between 
either to conform with or to disobey IPR laws and regulations in her country. The law is said 
to be implemented efficiently in case the pirate conform to it. However, if the pirate chose not 
to do so, then the benefit of her piracy must be greater than the cost, which includes her 
feelings of guilt and as well as the probability of getting caught multiplied by the fine and the 
consequential social embarrassment she will suffer from. Here, the moral and ethical 
background of the society is an important factor that controls the pirate’s expected action. 
This is because the pirate’s guilty feelings are directly affected with the pirate’s morality in 
the first place. The social embarrassment is related to the society’s moral code as well. 
Moreover, the motivation of law enforcers to apply this law is also affected by their own 
moral and ethical standards. In a highly religious society, the law enforcers, as well as the 
society as a whole, could view any formal law as a null if it contradicts with the teachings of 
the dominant religion.    This model will continue to iterate as long as the benefits of breaking 
the formal institutions outweigh their costs. The existence of discrepancies between de jure 
and de facto legal enforcement, as a result of the absence of public support (informal or 
internal institutions working against or are neutral to formal or external institutions) can be 
considered an important determinant of the ineffectiveness of formal laws. This diagram 
                                                 
8 For more details, see Lanjouw and Lerner (1997: 22). 
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could be used as a basis to provide a political-economic explanation for the interplay between 
the designed scheme of IPR enforcement and the pattern of individual behaviour in order to 
explain the reasons behind existing institutional deficiencies. 
 
Figure 3: The Interplay between Rule and Behaviour 
 
A shoplifter who decides to steal is aware of the consequences of his action. If she is caught, 
the police will sanction him, and this action is totally supported by a general acceptance of the 
society to punish a thief. The case of IPR piracy in general and copyright products piracy in 
specific in developing countries is however different: It is weakly probable to get caught, and 
if the pirate is caught it rarely happens that he is given a proper sanction. Moreover, the 
society will not be disgraced of him for his action. In addition no one would help the police to 
catch him at the first place. Therefore, it is difficult to find an efficient solution entirely within 
the legal system. However, religion can play an important role in this case as data obtained by 
the Gallup Polls, which were conducted through 143 countries, show that among countries 
where average annual incomes are USD2,000 or less, 92% of residents surveyed state that 
religion is an important part of their daily lives. Conversely, among the richest countries 
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surveyed - those where average annual incomes are USD25,000 or more - the figure drops to 
44% only (Crabtree and Pelham, 2009a). This shows that poor countries are more religious. 
Moreover, according to BSA report on piracy (2009), piracy is mostly high in developing 
countries (Figure 1). This indicates that as IPR piracy problem is more severe in the case of 
developing countries and as these countries tend to be more religious, one can think of 
religion as being a more effective tool to signal the unethical behavior of IPR infringement to 
the society. To sum up, it can be said that the effectiveness of formal institutions in general 
and IPR laws in specific will mainly depend on achieving legitimacy through national actors, 
which imply that the enforcement of the new rule should be approved by the society itself. 
They must realize the importance of the rule, expect to reap certain benefits from conveying 
to it and understand the ethical values behind respecting it. In other words, the law or the 
formal institution must be localized. Issuing new rules or institutions should be accompanied 
by local awareness about the essentiality of the institution and moreover certain linkages to 
one or more informal or cultural factors of the country in question. Religious motives can 
create such an informal protection mechanism, which increases the cost of piracy actions, 
given that people are religious, or in other words, given that these people are keen to follow 
their religion.  
 
IV. Relating Global Religious Loyalty to IPR Piracy  
We illustrated in the previous section how informal institutions can entail a certain informal 
protection mechanism that can deter IPR piracy. However, due to the informality of this 
protection  mechanism, it is, therefore, totally dependent on the loyalty and adherence of 
individuals towards a specific informal institution in the first place. As the informal institution 
focused upon in this study is religion, it is essential to examine how much do different 
societies adhere to religious teachings and also to check whether these religious teachings can 
help in reducing the level of IPR piracy through its respective societies. Hence, we analyze 
the degree of religiosity within different countries to measure the loyalty to the institutions 
stemming from religion.  
 
Various measurements of religiosity are  already  developed.  Gallup’s religiosity index 
(Crabtree and Pelham, 2009b) is one of the fundamental measurements of religiosity across 
countries. Gallup asks respondents in 143 countries and territories whether religion is an 
important part of their daily lives. However, since the index is only based on this specific 19 
 
question, it is limited as it does not tackle how much respondents apply their religion in their 
daily life actions. Barro and McCleary (2006) use Herfindahl index
9
•  „Indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Religion?” (Question 
V9).  
 to test for the degree of 
religion pluralism in a certain country. Nevertheless, their proposed „Pluralism Index“ 
remains inadequate for our purpose since only it only uses one wave of world values survey, 
(year 2000). Therefore, a limited number of countries were analyzed, mostly western ones. As 
a result of the aforementioned, the authors developed a Religious-Loyalty index (RLI) to 
better capture the adherence of countries to religion. The main premise of RLI is based on 
figures provided by the World Values Survey (WVS). From the period lasting from 1981 to 
2008, The WVS, in collaboration with European Values Study (EVS) carried out five waves 
of representative national surveys in 97 societies containing almost 90 percent of the world's 
population. WVS mainly deals with what people in different societies want out of life and 
what they believe in (World Values Survey, 2009a). We have chosen a set of questions that 
indicate the degree of religiosity across different societies, these questions are: 
o  The respondents are asked to provide their answer on a scale of the following 
four degrees: „Very important“, „Rather important“, „Not very important“ and 
„not at all important“.  
•  „Could you tell me how much confidence you have in these specific organizations: the 
Churches
10
o  The respondents are asked to provide their answer on a scale of four degrees: 
„A great deal“, „Rather important“, „Not very important“ and „not at all 
important“.  
? “(Question V131).  
•  „Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend 
religious services these days? “ (Question V186).  
o  The respondents are asked to provide their answer on a scale of seven degrees: 
„More than once a week“,“ Once a week“, „Once a month“, „Only on special 
holy days/Christmas/Easter days“, „Once a year“, „Less often“ and „Never 
practically never“. 
                                                 
9 Although Herfindahl index was originally developed to measure trade concentration in a certain country 
(Hirschman, 1964), Barro and McCleary (2006) used the same concept on religious denominations in the 
sampled countries. 
10 WVS 2005 codebook indicates that the word “Churches” in the WVS questions is substituted by the phrase 
“religious leaders” in surveys done in non-Christian countries (WVS, 2009b). 20 
 
•  „Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are a religious 
person? “ (Question V187).  
o  The respondents are asked to provide their answer on a scale of four degrees: 
„A religious person“, „Not a religious person“, „A convinced atheist” and 
„Other answer“.  
•  „Generally speaking, do you think that the churches in your country are giving 
adequate answers to the moral problems and needs of the individual? “ (Question 
V188).  
o  The respondents are asked to provide their answer with only „Yes” or „No“. 
Our country sample includes mainly all the 85 countries that their citizens were surveyed 
about their religious preferences and denomination through the fourth and fifth WVS survey 
waves, which was conducted between 1999 and 2008. We have divided the sample countries 
by the dominant religious denomination in each country. For this cause, we used the data 
supplied by adherents .com (2005), a specialized website that have a collection of over 43,870 
statistics  related to religion adherence and religious geography  citations.  Adherents.com 
describes itself as the “2nd most frequently visited general religion site on the Internet, with 
an average of 13,500 unique visitors per day”. Although this source provides the needed data 
on religion of most of the countries in our sample, the specific religious sect followed by the 
majority in some countries are not given. Consequently, another source (CIA World 
Factbook, 2010) was used to review the findings from the previous source as well as to 
provide us with the missing religious denomination for the remaining countries (for a full list, 
see Table A in Appendix). Our next step was to assemble the survey results of the questions 
chosen for each country. The intention here is to assimilate the percentage of religious persons 
in each country sample through collecting the number of respondents that believe and act 
according to a certain religion. For our first question (Religion importance in life: Question 
V9), the percentage of the respondents who chose the first two answer choices (“Very 
Important“ and „Rather important“) were summed. This is also done regarding the second 
question (Confidence in Churches: Question V131) as we have also summed the respondents 
percentages that choose one of the first two answers („A great deal “and „Rather important“). 
As for the third question (attending religious services: Question V186), we have summed the 
respondents percentage that gave one of those two answers („More than once a week“ and 
“Once a week“). As for the fourth question (Religious person: V187), we have indicated the 
respondents percentage that answered „Yes“. The same was done regarding the fifth and last 
question (Churches give answers to moral problems: Question V188). It is perceived that 21 
 
these percentages collected so far represent the percentage of society that is inclined towards 
religion in each country sampled.  
 
A factor analysis followed in order to construct a scale of religious loyalty by the type of 
religion  using the percentage of religion adherents across all sampled countries. Since 
Hinduism and Shinto are represented through our sample by only one country each, they were 
discarded from our analysis. A normalization of values then took place so that the index range 
is [0, 1], where 0 indicates non- or low level of religiosity and 1 indicates a high level of 
religiosity. An average RLI of each religious denomination is then calculated for comparison. 
(For the complete list of RLI by country and religion type, see Table B in Appendix). The 
results, as shown in table 1, indicate that Islamic countries are highly adherent to Islam, since 
the group RLI average reached 0.72, indicating a high level of religious-loyalty. This becomes 
more apparent when it is compared by the group averages of other religions, where their 
group RLI averages range between 0.33 (Buddhism) and 0.49 (Orthodox Christianity).  
 
Table 1: RLI by Religion 
  Count  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation  Range  Minimum  Maximum 
Buddhism  3  0.34  0.23  0.20  0.36  0.21  0.57 
Catholic  35  0.47  0.49  0.23  0.87  0.02  0.89 
Islam  18  0.73  0.77  0.15  0.50  0.42  0.92 
Orthodox  13  0.49  0.44  0.16  0.52  0.26  0.78 
Protestant  14  0.36  0.26  0.27  0.76  0.11  0.87 
 
As for the IPR, we investigated the average piracy rate for our sample countries using 
software piracy data provided by the annual reports of Business Software Alliance (BSC). 
The data supplied is between the years 2003 and 2009 and had some limitations in  its 
coverage. Therefore, few countries were missing through our dataset (for the full list of 
countries covered and their respective IPR piracy rates see Table C in the Appendix). Table 2 
provides statistics on IPR piracy by religious group. It can be clearly seen that Orthodox 








Table 2: Piracy Rate by Religion 
  
Count  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Range  Minimum  Maximum 
Buddhism  3  70.3  78.3  22.8  43.6  44.6  88.1 
Catholicism  31  49.7  45.9  16.7  61.3  21.0  82.3 
Islam  13  74.4  76.7  12.2  39.8  52.0  91.8 
Orthodox  12  76.6  77.5  13.0  43.6  51.4  95.0 
Protestant  13  38.3  28.9  19.5  69.7  20.7  90.4 
Source: Business Software Alliance (BSA), Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study, Various Issues. 
 
Linking these two results together, Figure 4 illustrates the relation between our two 
variables. It can be deduced that Islamic countries have a high level of both, IPR piracy and 
religiosity. Somewhat this result is not surprising since all the Islamic countries in our sample 
are considered to be developing ones, therefore have this aforementioned trend of low level of 
economic development and high levels of piracy and religiosity. This can even explain the 
position of protestant countries which are most composed of countries with high level of 
economic development. Moreover, these countries have a low piracy and religiosity levels. 
Islamic countries are shown to be exceedingly more religious than their nearest religious 
group, Orthodox countries, which, also, are mostly composed of developing ones.  
 
Figure 4: Linking IPR piracy to Religiosity 
 
 
It is clear from this result that Islamic societies are more adherent to religion than other 
religions. As Islam provides the value system for its adherents, basically reflected in their 
societies at a macro-level, it can be used as an informal institution to influence the behaviour 






























societies are still keen to follow the rules of their religion and search for answers using 
sentences of the Quran. A lot of Islamic rules are still followed which are in their nature much 
stricter and enjoy a greater opportunity cost than piracy, like Hijab  or the fastening of 
Ramadan month. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to ask whether Islam as a religion 
followed favourably by its adherents can be used as an informal enforcement mechanism to 
support the IPR enforcement process in Islamic countries. In other words, is it able to 
formulate a belief among Muslims that IPR piracy is unethical and prohibited by Islam, thus, 
creating a sort of informal sanction mechanism that can increase the marginal cost of IPR 
pirates and positively affect combating piracy in these countries? For this reason, an 
investigation of how Islam views IPR piracy is necessary.  
 
 
V. Does Islam support IPR piracy? 
5.1 Islam and IPR protection  
As it was aforementioned, Islam demands its followers to adhere to a large system of rules, 
regulations, values and normative framework covering all aspects of life for Muslims. Gibb 
(1950) states that “law in the eyes of the Muslim scholars was not in fact an independent or 
empirical study. It was the practical aspect of the religious and social doctrine preached by 
Mohammed. For the early Muslims there was little or no distinction between 'legal' and 
'religious'. In the Qur‘an the two aspects are found side by side, or rather interwoven one with 
the other, and so likewise in the Hadith  (Prophet Mohammed’s sayings). The study and 
interpretation of the Qur‘an involved sometimes the one (legal) and sometimes the other 
(religious)”. The primary sources of Shari’ah (Islamic legal traditions
11
                                                 
11 We use Ali (2009) definition of Sharia as ‘Islamic legal tradition’ rather than ‘Islamic law’ for the same reason 
he derived; “to avoid creating a restrictive fence around an evolving tradition” (Ali, 2009:117-118) 
) are Qur’an, Sunnah 
(words, actions and practices of the prophet Mohammad) as well as the human articulation 
and comprehension of the aforementioned primary sources (Ali, 2009:117). The human 
deduction is stressed upon in our analysis since, as Kamali (1991) points out, “The Qur’an 
and Sunnah themselves contain very little by way of methodology, but rather provide the 
indications from which the rules of Shari’ah can be deduced”. As Jamar (1992) notes, that in 
order to establish a certain legal proposition to be followed by Muslims, one should be able to 
point to a certain verse of the Quran, or the Sunnah of the prophet Mohammad that directly 
tackles this legal proposition, giving clear rules and regulations regarding it. If this proved to 
be unfruitful, then if a certain point in history can be found when all Muslim legal scholars 24 
 
agreed upon a particular interpretation of a certain Islamic text, then in this case, their 




. Use of analogical reasoning, or Qiyas, is very limited in Islamic legal traditions 
(Jamar, 1992:2). Qiyas is the extension of a certain legal tradition in Islam from an original 
case to a new one, because the latter has the same effective underpinning as the former. The 
original case is regulated by a given text, and Qiyas tries to expand the same textual ruling to 
the new case (Kamali, 1991:180). Qiyas, however, seems to be most suitable in legislative 
situations which, due to the advances of culture and knowledge were not envisaged in the 
time of prophet Mohammed, 1500 years ago. 
Jamar (1992) divides Islamic legal traditions to three areas; firstly, areas which have clear 
and precise rules and regulations, such as spiritual duties and inheritance. Secondly, areas 
which were given some general principles, but with some indefiniteness, as in contract law, 
and finally, areas that were out of Islamic legal boundaries as in the field of intellectual 
property (IP). Consequently, Muslim Judges are obliged to formulate Islamic verdict that 
relate to IPR, taking into consideration that these rules do not “run afoul of shari'ah 
prohibitions and are consistent with shari'ah  principles” (Jamar, 1992:3).  The main 
methodology for derivation of Islamic legislation towards IPR is Qiyas  (analogical 
reasoning). Islamic definition of property rights generically concedes with that of North 
(1990) and Sened (1997) where the former defines it as being the rights individuals 
appropriate or practice over their own labour and the goods and services they possess. 
According to North (1990), IP could take the form of industrial property (protected by patents 
or trade secrets or utility models) on the one hand, or the form of an artistic work or software 
program (protected by copyrights), on the other hand. Sened (1997) relates the concept of IPR 
to law and describes IPR  as being the field of law that deals with property rights in intangible 
property, and it refers to the creation of human mind and intellect. Thus, when dealing with 
IP, we are faced with the problem of providing public goods. Therefore, it can be argued that 
Islam recognizes the two forms of IP, whether as a public or private good. A considerable 
amount of Quranic and Sunnah literature strongly tackled stealing and cheating of public and 
private property. Consequently, Muslim judges use Qiyas in dealing with IPR piracy, where 
the same Quranic and Sunnah literature are expanded through interpretation to include IPR as 
                                                 
12 Kamali (1991) defines Ijma as “as the unanimous agreement of the mujtahidun, of the Muslim community of 
any period following the demise of the Prophet Mohammad on any matter” (Kamali, 1991:156) 25 
 
well (see Alghamdi,:39 and Jamar, 1992:3-4). Moreover, many fatwas
13 exhaustively tackled 
IPR piracy. An Islamic website (islamweb.net) lists 194 fatwas that covers IPR from every 
aspect
14. Furthermore, The International Islamic Fiqh Academy, which consists of the highest 
Islamic religious authorities in all Islamic countries, tackled the topic of IPR in its 5
th round 
held in Kuwait in 1988 and issued a fatwa
15
•  „And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, nor use it as bait for 
the judges, with intent that ye may eat up wrongfully and knowingly a little of (other) 
people's property“ (Qur’an, Chapter 2: Verse 188) 
. The basic consensus in all these fatwas as well as 
a considerable body of research that investigate how Islam views IPR piracy concludes that 
such type of piracy is prohibited by Islam (see Alghamdi, 2005; Khalil, 2003; Abou Elkhir, 
2002 and Alnaggar, 2002; Amanullah, 2006 among others). A list of Quranic verses has been 
used as evidence for the prohibition of IPR piracy in Islam, among them: 
•  „O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: But let 
there be amongst you Traffic and trade by mutual good-will: Nor kill (or destroy) 
yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you Most Merciful!“ (Qur’an, Chapter 4: 
Verse 29) 
•  “Allah doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due; 
And when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice” (Qur’an, 
Chapter 4: Verse 58) 
•   “Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin 
and rancour: fear Allah, for Allah is strict in punishment.” (Qur’an, Chapter 5: Verse 
2) 
•  “Give just measure and weight, nor withhold from the people the things that are their 
due; and do no mischief on the earth after it has been set in order: that will be best for 
you, if ye have Faith.” (Qur’an, Chapter 7: Verse 85) 
•  “O ye that believe! Betray not the trust of Allah and the Messenger, nor 
misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you.” (Qur’an, Chapter 8: Verse 27) 
 
 
                                                 
13 Mariam-Webster’s online dictionary (2009) defines fatwa as a “legal opinion or decree handed down by an 
Islamic religious leader“. For a thorough look on the range on definitions of fatwa, see Ali (2009:121). 
14 See these Fatwas on IPR at http://www.islamweb.net/ver2/Fatwa/FatwaCategory.php?lang=A&CatId=2180 
(in Arabic). Retrieved  November 17, 2009. 
15 For the fatwa issued by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy on IPR, see http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/ 26 
 
Hadith are also used in presenting the case against IPR piracy in Islam, among hadith used 
are: 
•  "Muslims must abide by their agreements, except an agreement that make Haram 
(unlawful) what is Halal (lawful) or make Halal what was Haram." (Al-Tirmidhi, 
Hadith No. 1272). 
•  "Whoever precedes others in gaining a Halal (lawful) thing, will be more entitled to 
own it (than others)." (AlQaari, No.492) 
•  "He who cheats is not of us (Muslims). Deceitfulness and fraud are things that lead 
one to Hell." (Ibn Hanbal, No. 4968 ) 
•   “Honesty and clarity are blessed for both parties to a sale, while concealment and 
deceit destroy the blessings of their sale.” (Al-Bukharî, No. 1937) 
•  “Don’t betray he who have betrayed you and (Keep and) pay back the trusts of those 
who entrust you.” (Al-Sanaani, No. 1483) 
 
Islamic legal traditions divide the acts of a Muslim into five main categories: Wajib 
(obligatory), Mustahabb/Sunnah (recommended), Mubah (permitted, neither obligatory nor 
recommended),  Makruh  (recommended against, abominable) and Haram  (prohibited, 
banned). Throughout the Islamic literature and  fatwas, IPR piracy is judged to be Haram- the 
highest degree of prohibition. This clearly shows that Islam basically backs up laws and 
regulations - whether nationally or internationally - that prohibits any kind of IPR piracy.  
 
Although the Islamic legal tradition towards IPR piracy generically prohibits this act, there 
are still many significant factors that Muslim legal scholars take into consideration when they 
issue any fatwa  relating  to IPR issue. Fatwa  generally change through time and place, 
therefore it is of key importance for Muslim Legal scholars to build a real and exact image of 
the situation in hand so that Fatwas can be as close to reality as possible. Ibn Qayyim (d. 
1349) mentions that: “fatwa  can experience change due to differences in period, place, 
situation, customs and intention”. Fatwas depend on several factors, which play a crucial role 
in determining the degree of prohibition of IPR piracy as seen by Muslim legal scholars, and 
they include the type of infringed intellectual property in question (whether it is for an 
educational or entertainment purpose)
16
                                                 
16 Fatwa on IPR No. 123712 (in Arabic). Retrieved November 20, 2009 
 (Islamweb, 2009), the availability of the item under 
http://www.islamweb.net/ver2/Fatwa/ShowFatwa.php?lang=A&Id=123712&Option=FatwaId 27 
 
intellectual property protection for purchasing
17 (Islamweb, 2009), whether the act of piracy 
is done for personal use or for public broadcasting
18 (Islamweb, 2009), and, most importantly, 




 (Islamweb, 2009; Abou Elkhir, 2002 and Khalil, 2003).  
5.2 Pricing strategies under Islamic rules 
According to Bashar (1997), Islamic Shari’ah has categorised prices as valid or invalid. A 
valid price refers to the price given in a market with accordance to Islamic Law. This means 
that such price must be free from any deliberate attempt to cheat, deceive, conceal, lie or 
withhold relevant information of a certain good or service. Valid price is a one that satisfies 
all possible Shari’ah legal requirements in the process of formation. Muslim legal scholars 
allow these valid prices to reign in the market and disallow them when they conflict with 
fairness and justice and/or societal interests. An invalid price, on the contrary, is that price 
which does not follow the Islamic legal requirements. It is likely that such a price will be 
higher than normal price. Invalidity of price may occur if a firm manipulated supply by 
creating artificial scarcity. Therefore, prices that will emerge in the market if monopolists or 
producers form cartels exert influence on output or prohibit others from competing in the 
market are considered invalid and not lawful under Islamic jurisprudence (Bashar, 1997:41-
42).  
 
As for the case of IPR, Fellmeth (1998) points out in his study on copyright misuse and the 
limits of intellectual property monopoly that copyright owners are given an exclusive right to 
make, use, copy, sell or import the respective subject of the patent or copyright for a limited 
time, allowing them to act as “temporary, limited monopolists” therefore, controlling the 
nature of  their protected goods through using methods that might otherwise breach the 
antitrust laws. Stiglitz (2008) shares the same opinion and notes that “Intellectual Property 
Rights generate monopoly power that can be used to leverage further monopoly power. The 
most obvious example is Microsoft, which has leveraged its monopoly power in operating 
                                                 
17 Fatwa on IPR No. 13170 (in Arabic). Retrieved November 20, 2009 
http://www.islamweb.net/ver2/Fatwa/ShowFatwa.php?Option=FatwaId&lang=A&Id=13170 








systems to obtain a dominant position in applications like word processing (Microsoft Office) 
and Internet browsers (Internet Explorer).”  
 
Khalil (2003) deduces that Islam prohibits monopolistic acts by copyright holders based on 
the Hadith: “He who monopolizes is a wrong-doer" (Muslim, No. 3012). In this case, Muslim 
legal scholars give permission to Muslim public to illegally copy software but only for 
personal purposes and not for the intention of selling it afterwards (Islamweb, 2009)
20
•  “But if one is forced by necessity, without wilful disobedience, nor transgressing due 
limits,  -  then is he guiltless. For Allah is Oft-forgiving Most Merciful.” (Qur’an, 
Chapter 2: Verse 173) 
. 
Muslim Legal scholars view such case as a “necessity” and allow it only in a limited account. 
Quranic verses give legitimacy to this necessity: 
•  “...Except under compulsion of necessity” (Qur’an, Chapter 6: Verse 119) 
To sum up, we can state that Islamic prohibition of IPR is not as direct as it was assumed 
from other studies dealing with this issue (i,e,  Jamar, 1992; Alghamdi, 2005; Amanullah, 
2006). We have demonstrated that Muslim legal scholars base their opinion in IPR-related 
fatwa on the inquirer’s social and economic status as well as the kind of intellectually 
protected item under investigation. Most Muslim societies suffer from low levels of economic 
development which is also reflected on the low income of a large proportion in Muslims in 
their respective societies. Moreover, prices of intellectually-protected  items coming from 
developed countries remain relatively expensive for the Muslim layman. Consequently, 
Muslim legal scholars might issue adverse fatwas that permit Muslims to pirate IPR products 
due to their high prices. In other words, IPR-related fatwa generally prohibits piracy actions, 
but given the extreme high prices of the original products that are imposed by international 
monopolistic firms, without any consideration of the necessity of the product to the poor, 
fatwas might become more lenient leading to a controversial effect to the extent of supporting 
piracy. This point can explain why there are numerous fatwas prohibiting IPR piracy and at 
the same time, Islamic countries have such high level of piracy. In the next section, we will 
propose a mechanism of how informal enforcement of IPR laws plays a more effective role in 
Islamic countries. 
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VI. The Role of Informal IPR enforcement in Islamic Countries 
Becker (1968) described criminals as rational individuals that are trying to maximize their 
utility. His major idea is that the decision to commit a crime is similar to the decision to 
undertake an investment. Hence, in order to understand the rationale behind piracy behaviour, 
one should weigh the expected costs of a pirate with the expected benefits. Pirates are usually 
faced by minimal costs, due to the low marginal cost of reproducing software products, in 
addition to the low probability of getting caught and hence punished.  
 
Following the idea of Becker, the pirates maximizing problem can be written as follows: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( i i i i i i i i Y U p F Y U p EU − + − =         (eq. 1) 
Where: 
i p : is the probability of a criminal to get convicted per offence 
i U : is the criminal’s utility function 
i Y : is the criminal’s income 
i F : is the monetary equivalent of the punishment 
Varian (1999), however, pointed out that the optimal level of enforcement is supposed to 
avoid the difficulties related to enforcement such as: the relatively high monitoring costs of 
the legal system and the relatively low marginal cost faced by thieves. 
 
Accordingly, the shoplifter-maximizing problem will be: 
 
∏ − Fx e x MaxB ) ( ) (              (eq. 2) 
Where: 
x: is the number of stolen units 
B(x):  are the expected benefits from stealing  
e:  is the level of enforcement 
∏(e):  is the probability of getting caught  
F:  is the expected fine of the thief or /and prison term 
 
 
Relating Varian’s model to our IPR piracy problem and our previously explained model of 
the interplay between formal rule and behaviour, we have to include both: informal and 
formal sanctioning mechanisms. Varian only included a formal sanction which is the 
punishment according to the law and totally monitored by the legal system. However the 
sanction and impact of the society is still missing. Social disgrace and moreover guilt feelings 
and other moral impediment were totally abundant by his model. Hence we can rewrite 




∏ + − FSx e e x MaxB ) ( ) ( 2 1                   (eq. 3) 
 
Where: 
x: is the number of infringed units 
B(x): are the expected benefits from piracy  
e1, e2: are the levels of enforcement due to formal and informal enforcement, respectively 
∏ (e): is the probability of getting caught  
F: is the expected fine or prison term imposed on the thief, according to law 
S: is the expected social sanction, imposed by members of the society 
 
This model takes the impact of a formal institution, as well as an informal institution into 
consideration. Both types are associated with formal and informal sanctioning mechanisms, 
respectively. Most economists totally neglect the role of informal institutions when 
determining the costs of committing a crime, focusing solely on the formal sanction of the 
law
21
) ( 1 e
. Social disgrace, guilt feelings and other moral impediment were totally abundant by 
formal models in the field of law and economics tackling the problem of enforcement. S, on 
the one hand, represents an informal sanction that associates an informal institution (social, 
cultural or religious rule), that sanctions or disgraces piracy behaviour. While F, on the other 
hand,  represents the possible formal sanction according to law. Moreover, the level of 
enforcement (e) will be divided into two types: formal enforcement  and informal 
enforcement ) ( 2 e . As  ) ( 1 e   represents enforcement held officially through the state (police 
officers are those who detect the crime),  ) ( 2 e denotes the enforcement held by the society 
itself in form of reporting to the police or refusing to buy pirated copies. The pirate will 
choose the level of x that will equate his marginal benefit MB to his marginal cost MC. 
So the equilibrium will be: 
 
  MC FS e e MB = + =∏ ) ( 2 1                      (eq. 4) 
 
Thus, the level of piracy will depend on the marginal cost of piracy, which is  ∏ ) ( 2 1 e e + FS 
compared to the expected marginal benefit. Watt (2002) summarized the difficulties of 
copyright enforcement by simply saying that the high transaction costs of monitoring the use 
of copyrights  ) ( 1 e  and the low copying and distribution cost of copyright materials are the 
main reasons behind the difficult enforcement of copyrights. In other words, increasing the 
probability of getting caught through formal devices ) ( 1 e  fundamentally requires dedicating 
more authorities and financial resources for the enforcement process, which is very costly and 
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hence forms a main obstacle for achieving adequate IPR enforcement. Varian (1999) for 
example, used a similar equation to identify the maximization problem of a shop lifter or a 
thief, totally neglecting the role of informal institutions. He used the following equation: 
MC F e MB = =∏ ) (                                                                          (eq. 5) 
Varian explained that in order to determine the optimal level of enforcement, the government 
should set the lowest possible level of enforcement that results in a positive probability of 
apprehension and impose a maximum fine. To the extent of our knowledge, all former 
existing models explaining theft or criminal intents totally neglected the role of S and the 
informal enforcement process ) ( 2 e . S in this case can have a twofold effect: First, it creates 
another level of informal enforcement which might increase  ∏ ) ( 2 1 e e + , as legal authorities, 
as well as the rest of the society will be discouraging piracy behavior, and hence, citizens 
might report it to the police, which itself is now more motivated to punish pirates for their 
unethical behaviour. Second, S is a punishment in itself, as it comprises an informal sanction 
by the society and imposes a guilt feeling of carrying out a shameful behaviour.   
However, it must be taken into consideration that the price of original IPR products still 
plays a major role in the factual prohibition of IPR piracy in Islamic countries as Muslim legal 
scholars still perceive the idea that prices of essential software or other IPR products are 
ridiculously high for the average Muslim living in developing countries. Accordingly, they 
respond by allowing IPR piracy but in a limited way. Hence, it can be said that prices remain 
the main impediment against using Islam to combat software piracy in Islamic countries.  
 
Accordingly it can be said that software prices (P) have an inverse relation with the informal 
enforcement (e2) as administrated in this case by religion over the Islamic societies (Figure 5). 
High prices can induce Muslim legal scholars to give permission for Muslim public to 
illegally copy software since such prices prohibits Muslims in developing countries to 
purchase important software, especially ones used for educational purposes. Such an outcome 
diminishes social support and enforcement of IPR protection and consequently the resulting 
sanction, as social disgrace and guilt feelings are kept to a minimal level in this case. 
Conversely, if right holders of software pursued a price discrimination strategy that takes into 
consideration the income level per capita for countries where software is distributed, this will 
consequently make Muslim legal scholars in respective Islamic developing countries more 
affirm in applying the fundamental Islamic opinion on IPR piracy. As a result, social sanction 
will increase tremendously since social disgrace and guilt feelings associated with breaking an 32 
 
Islamic rule will reach its peak since there will be no excuse given to illegally copy software. 
The inverse relation between (P) and ( 2 e ) is represented in the following equation: 





Figure 5: The Relation between Software Prices (P) and Informal Enforcement (e2) in 
Muslim Countries 
 
VII. Conclusion and policy recommendation 
This study makes four contributions to the broader literature of institutional economics. 
First, it applies a new theoretical approach to the concept of embeddedness of institutions, an 
area that has been neglected so far by most institutional economics literature. Opper (2008) 
states that “economists so far have paid particularly little attention to the embeddedness of 
institutions. Politically monitored formal institutions will not achieve satisfactory results 
without the support of prevailing informal institutions in a country. Research and theorizing 
on the mechanics of informal norms were left to other social sciences, in particular to 
sociologists”. Second, linking IPR piracy to NIE is considered genuine in both hypothesis and 
analysis. Although former studies linked IPR piracy to cultural and ethical determinants, their 
hypothesis did not relate to the main premise of NIE as demonstrated by Williamson’s (2000) 
levels of social analysis. Consequently, this affected the tools used by such studies in 
analyzing the subtle reasons behind increasing piracy rates in different societies, especially in 
developing countries. Third, an analysis of religious loyalty is carried out through this study 
as an attempt to assess religion as an informal institutional structure governing different 




society have chosen a certain public action due to its religion inclination, however, it is 
logically understandable that different societies vary in their adherence to religion due to a 
vast amount of factors that are out of the scope of this study. By relying on this measurement, 
the link between rules and behaviour of societies are clearer since religion dimension, with all 
its consequences on informal institutions, is added to the analysis. Finally, an analysis of the 
link between IPR piracy and Islam as an informal institution is conducted. We believe that by 
analysing and understanding the informal structure governing IPR piracy in Islamic countries, 
we can develop a more effective method to combat this illegal behaviour, without having to 
bear the additional cost of enforcement.  
 
Our main conclusion is that IPR piracy in Islamic countries can be tackled in a more 
effective way if religious dimensions are integrated in the campaign against this illegal act. 
This can be done through increasing awareness of Muslim legal scholars on the severity of 
IPR piracy problem and its economic consequence. It was already mentioned that the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy issued a fatwa in 1988 prohibiting IPR infringement. 
This academy is composed of the highest religious authorities in Muslim countries (grand 
muftis in sunni countries and ayatollah in shiite ones) whom are highly influential in Muslim 
societies as they issue the official legal opinions and fatwas on interpretations of Islamic law, 
inducing Islamic texts towards practical application by followers on a national level. Our 
survey results shows that Islamic countries’ population is highly confident in these religious 
leaders, since an average of 83% of the sample collected from these countries had either ‘a 
great deal of confidence’ or ‘quite a lot of confidence’ towards those religious authorities. 
Official fatwas issued by those leaders are also highly influential in formulating the legal 
opinion given by sheikhs in mosques, since these sheikhs are employed by the government. 
An important dimension that should be however considered by right holders is their pricing 
strategy in developing countries, especially Islamic ones. Although Islam initially prohibits 
acts of IPR piracy, high prices of important and essential IPR inversely affect the degree of 
prohibition set by Islam. Hence a price- discriminatory strategy is required not only for a 
developing country but also within the different consumer groups of the same country e.g. 
students, government offices and private sector. Finally, a more focused campaign run by 
Muslim scholars against acts of IPR piracy in Muslim countries shall be conducted. 
Integrating religion in the campaign against IPR piracy needs to be covered by more research 
on this issue. Therefore, this can be a call for more studies to be conducted on the link 
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Appendix 
Table A: List of Countries by Predominant Religion
 
Buddhism 
1.  South Korea 
2.  Thailand 




1.  Andorra 
2.  Argentina 
3.  Austria 
4.  Belgium 
5.  Brazil 
6.  Canada 
7.  Chile 
8.  Colombia 
9.  Croatia 






























1.  India 
 
Islam 
1.  Albania 
2.  Algeria 
3.  Bangladesh 
4.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
5.  Burkina Faso 
6.  Egypt 
7.  Indonesia 
8.  Iran 













1.  Belarus 
2.  Bulgaria 
3.  Cyprus 
4.  Ethiopia 
5.  Georgia 
6.  Greece 
7.  Macedonia 
8.  Moldova 









1.  Australia 
2.  Denmark 
3.  Estonia 
4.  Finland 
5.  Germany 
6.  Ghana 
7.  Iceland 
8.  Latvia 
9.  Norway 
10. South Africa 
11. Sweden 
12. United Kingdom 




1.  Japan 
 
 
Source: Aherents.com website, 
Predominant Religion, 2005. Retrieved 
November 2, 2010 and CIA World 
Factbook, Field listing-Religion, 2010. 



















































Table B: Religious Loyalty Index (RLI) by Country and Religious Group 
 
Religion  Country (Year of WVS Survey)  RLI  Average by Religious Group 
Buddhism 
South Korea (2005)  0.2330 
0.3381  Thailand (2007)  0.5692 
Vietnam (2006)  0.2123 
Catholic 
Christianity 
Andorra (2005)  0.0223 
0.4714 
Argentina (2006)  0.4067 
Austria (1999)  0.3174 
Belgium (1999)  0.2395 
Brazil (2006)  0.6783 
Canada (2006)  0.3891 
Chile (2006)  0.4680 
Colombia (2005)  0.6761 
Croatia (1999)  0.5591 
Czech Republic (1999)  0.0293 
France (2006)  0.1776 
Guatemala (2004)  0.7816 
Hungary (1999)  0.2555 
Ireland (1999)  0.4494 
Italy (2005)  0.6044 
Lithuania (1999)  0.5663 
Luxembourg (1999)  0.2598 
Malta (1999)  0.7370 
Mexico (2005)  0.5860 
Netherlands (2006)  0.1397 
Northern Ireland (1999)  0.4446 
Peru (2006)  0.5207 
Philippines (2001)  0.7398 
Poland (2005)  0.7067 
Portugal (1999)  0.6065 
Puerto Rico (2001)  0.7178 
Rwanda (2007)  0.7247 
Slovakia (1999)  0.5522 
Slovenia (2005)  0.2644 
Spain (2007)  0.1416 
Switzerland (2007)  0.2885 
Trinidad and Tobago (2006)  0.4943 
Uganda (2001)  0.8891 
Uruguay (2006)  0.2832  
 
Zambia (2007)  0.7841 
Islam 
Albania (2002)  0.4571 
0.7263 
Algeria (2002)  0.7338 
Bangladesh (2002)  0.8047 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001)  0.4203 
Burkina Faso (2007)  0.7616 
Egypt (2008)  0.7711 
Indonesia (2006)  0.8267 
Iran (2005)  0.6481 
Iraq (2006)  0.6271 
Jordan (2007)  0.8793 
Kyrgyzstan (2003)  0.4944 
Mali (2007)  0.8721 
Morocco (2007)  0.8257 
Nigeria (2000)  0.9191 
Pakistan (2001)  0.7841 
Saudi Arabia (2003)  0.7227 
Tanzania (2001)  0.8849 
Turkey (2007)  0.6419 
Orthodox 
Christianity 
Belarus (2000)  0.2609 
0.4912 
Bulgaria (2006)  0.2963 
Cyprus (2006)  0.4265 
Ethiopia (2007)  0.7284 
Georgia (2008)  0.7785 
Greece (1999)  0.4005 
Macedonia (2001)  0.4402 
Moldova (2006)  0.5565 
Montenegro (2001)  0.3636 
Romania (2005)  0.7314 
Russian Federation (2006)  0.4340 
Serbia (2006)  0.4805 
Ukraine (2006)  0.4891 
Protestant 
Christianity 
Australia (2005)  0.1771 
0.3609 
Denmark (1999)  0.2082 
Estonia (1999)  0.1270 
Finland (2005)  0.3122 
Germany (2006)  0.1423 
Ghana (2007)  0.8662 
Iceland (1999)  0.3496 
Latvia (1999)  0.3721  
 
Norway (2007)  0.1245 
South Africa (2007)  0.7321 
Sweden (2006)  0.1110 
United Kingdom (2006)  0.1904 
United States (2006)  0.5079 

































































Table C: Average Piracy Rate by Country and Religious Group (2003-2008) 
 
Religion  Country  Average Piracy Rate 
(2003-2008) 
Average by Religious 
Group 
Buddhism 
South Korea  44.6 
70,3  Thailand  78.3 
Vietnam  88.1 
Catholic Christianity 
Andorra  N/A 
50,1 
Argentina  73.7 
Austria  25.4 
Belgium  26.9 
Brazil  60.3 
Canada  33.1 
Chile  65.4 
Colombia  56.1 
Croatia  55.9 
Czech Republic  39.1 
France  43.6 
Guatemala  79.7 
Hungary  42.1 
Ireland  36.7 
Italy  49.9 
Lithuania  56.0 
Luxembourg  21.0 
Malta  45.6 
Mexico  62.3 
Netherlands  29.4 
Northern Ireland  N/A 
Peru  71.0 
Philippines  70.3 
Poland  57.0 
Portugal  41.7 
Puerto Rico  45.4 
Rwanda  N/A 
Slovakia  45.9 
Slovenia  48.9 
Spain  43.7 
Switzerland  26.7 
Trinidad and Tobago  N/A 
Uganda  N/A  
 
Uruguay  69.1 
Zambia  82.3 
Islam 
Albania  70.3 
74.8 
Algeria  76.7 
Bangladesh  83.7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  91.8 
Burkina Faso  68.0 
Egypt  N/A 
Indonesia  62.7 
Iran  86.0 
Iraq  N/A 
Jordan  85.0 
Kyrgyzstan  61.1 
Mali  N/A 
Morocco  N/A 
Nigeria  68.3 
Pakistan  82.9 
Saudi Arabia  84.4 
Tanzania  52.0 
Turkey  N/A 
Orthodox Christianity 
Belarus  64.7 
74.9 
Bulgaria  87.0 
Cyprus  69.3 
Ethiopia  51.4 
Georgia  N/A 
Greece  95.0 
Macedonia  60.4 
Moldova  71.0 
Montenegro  92.6 
Romania  82.2 
Russian Federation  69.6 
Serbia  77.9 
Ukraine  77.2 
Protestant Christianity 
Australia  86.1 
38.0 
Denmark  28.9 
Estonia  25.9 
Finland  52.3 
Germany  27.0 
Ghana  28.0 
Iceland  N/A 
Latvia  50.6  
 
Norway  56.6 
South Africa  29.7 
Sweden  35.4 
United Kingdom  25.9 
United States  27.1 
Zimbabwe  20.7 
Source: Business Software Alliance (BSA), Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study, Various Issues. 
 